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Summary 
 
 
Chapter 1 
As the food supply chain has become longer, more complex and opaque 
over the past fifty years, the gap between those who make food and 
those who eat it has widened. Public (dis)trust has become a major 
food issue – in particular where technology is involved. One 
explanation for distrust in food technology and innovation is that 
technology (en)actors fail to be responsive to a particular set of 
consumer-citizen concerns. Trust cannot be forced, but 
trustworthiness —a precondition for trust—can be enhanced. For the 
agri-food sector this means acting reliably, but also explicating the 
norms and values they act upon. After all, trust is a matter of normative 
expectations. Also, trustworthiness means to be responsive to public 
concerns and engage in a critical discussion about those norms and 
values. Responsiveness implies the readiness to provisionally 
acknowledge the legitimacy of raised concerns, and the willingness to 
think and speak about them. Responsible innovation in food technology 
means that technology (en)actors are, at least, sufficiently responsive 
to a broad variety of societal concerns. 
 
The main problem addressed in this dissertation is that a particular set 
of consumer-citizen concerns are structurally marginalized – by food 
engineers, policy makers, and even citizen-consumers – and kept away 
from the food innovation agenda. This is both a problem of democratic 
legitimacy (low acceptability) and of efficacy of costly innovations (low 
acceptance). With this dissertation, I offer an explanation of the 
problem and a perspective on solutions. The explanation consists of an 
analysis of the public discourse of food technology and innovation: I 
identify three conditions of the innovation agenda (often implicitly 
relied on by stakeholders) that make up for an artificial and untenable 
dichotomy between hard issues and soft concerns. My solution is two-
fold. I present recommendations for several stakeholder groups for 
how to make sure that this dichotomy will no longer pose an obstacle 
to fruitful stakeholder dialogue on food technologies and innovations; 
and I present a particular tool for dialogue facilitators who aim to give 
‘soft concerns’ a fair opportunity to gain access to the innovation 
193 
 
agenda. 
 
Chapter 2 
Food engineers and policy makers do recognize that public trust is a 
crucial ingredient for technological food innovations, and often 
consider this a reason to call for more transparency in the food chain 
and to provide objective, independent, consistent and unambiguous 
information to consumers (e.g. by labeling). But from the persistent 
distrust of food additives we learn that transparency and labeling do 
not necessarily dissolve the problem of distrust.  
 
My claim is that the persistence of distrust (of food additives) cannot 
be adequately understood without taking into account the wider range 
of ethical, aesthetic and cultural concerns. The idea that public dialogue 
should be organized more inclusively is nothing new, but to do this 
successfully requires a more in-depth understanding of what keeps 
engineers, policy makers, manufacturers and consumers from doing so. 
In my analysis of controversies on E-numbers, I have identified two 
discursive mechanisms: irrationalization and privatization. 
Irrationalization occurs where consumers who raise concerns are 
instantly labeled by technology (en)actors as emotional, inconsistent 
and uninformed. A more charitable interpretation, however, 
demonstrates that some of these concerns are more reasonable than 
they seem at face value. The preference for natural food can be 
understood as a consumer strategy to deal with the individual’s 
responsibility to choose safe and healthy food and the problem of how 
to identify them. It is not necessarily a rejection of modern technology, 
or a flight to the past, but a pragmatic retreat to the familiar and 
recognizable. This is a procedural concern closely related to the 
concern for safety and health. 
 
There are also more substantial concerns that have little to do with 
health and safety. The social meal argument is raised when consumers 
are concerned that food additives enable fast dinners to be enjoyed in 
solitude. Also, there is the concern that convenience foods may induce 
laziness and indifference: they compete with the pleasure of cooking. 
And there is the concern about the decay of taste and food culture. 
These concerns point out that food is a bearer of culture, a source of 
taste and pleasure, and an ingredient of the good life. Consumer-
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citizens are concerned that this is gradually disappearing due to 
modern food technologies. 
 
These concerns are not unreasonable once we realize that food 
additives do subscribe to ethical, cultural and aesthetic values and 
norms. In fact, this is how technology (en)actors themselves justify and 
promote the use of food additives. The mechanism of privatization 
occurs where concerns are excluded from the agenda for the reason 
that they do not deserve public attention – e.g. because they are 
considered to be informed by subjective and individual experiences; 
and thus cannot be expected to offer a common ground for meaningful 
(dis)agreement. This exclusion often relies on the logic of the free 
market: no one is actually forced to buy or eat anything, especially if 
consumers have a large range of options to choose from. Therefore, 
there would be no reason for discussing such concerns in the first 
place. 
 
However, I suggest that we understand some of these consumer 
concerns as an attempt to re-imagine which impacts of food technology 
count as public matters. Several scholars in STS and philosophy of 
technology have made clear that technologies mediate: they invite, 
hinder, enable, transform, guide, and restrict human action. In 
qualifying technologies as matters of public concern, they question the 
pervasiveness and desirability of technology’s impacts.  
 
Thus, the ethical, cultural, and aesthetic concerns about food additives 
cannot be dismissed for the reason that the consumption of processed 
food is simply a matter of individual and free choice, because that is 
exactly the claim that is contested in the first place. Such concerns are 
not as private as they seem. The recurrent appeal to consumer 
autonomy fails to recognize the mediating character of food additives, 
or at least paralyzes any meaningful public dialogue about it. 
 
Chapter 3 
Upon a closer look, we see that these two mechanisms are the 
manifestation of three implicit requirements that prescribe what types 
of concerns qualify as legitimate topics on the public innovation 
agenda. These requirements are three conditions for meaningful 
discussion. Each of them is grounded in a broader view of knowledge, 
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politics and technology respectively. With the notion of public 
innovation agenda I mean that part of the public agenda that seeks to 
inform various institutional agendas, and which in itself is shaped in 
and through informal public debate. The public innovation agenda is a 
set of issues (regarding technological innovation) commonly 
recognized by public and institutional actors as deserving attention 
and deliberation. This agenda is reflected in policy reports, consumer 
platforms, news media coverage, corporate mission statements, 
advertising, and so on. It is essentially a discourse agenda. 
 
The three conditions discussed below prescribe what kind of concerns 
do and do not have access to the public innovation agenda.  
 
(I) The condition of quantifiability prescribes that a concern’s 
substance is appropriate for measurement and can be expressed in 
quantitative terms. This idea relies on a positivist conception of 
knowledge and science. There are good reasons for this demand: (1) 
numbers give an accurate and stable representation of the world; (2) 
regularities allow for prediction and control; (3) calculation suggests 
impartiality, enabling accountability and the settlement of conflict; and 
(4) quantification enables standardization and comparison. 
Nevertheless, even the simplest operation of counting is an act of 
interpretation. In highly disputed matters, the use of numbers does not 
necessarily result in normative or epistemic agreement. Numbers may 
conceal but cannot substitute normative judgments. Numbers don’t 
speak for themselves. More importantly, anything can be counted and 
measured as soon as people decide to do so. People need good reasons 
to start quantifying qualitative concepts; and concerns may exactly 
offer those reasons. Also, by quantification we may get lost in 
translation: important experiences, meanings and values can be 
standardized, reduced, set aside and forgotten. Fortunately, apart from 
the repertoire of positivist science, scientific communities have many 
more resources to draw on in order to account for public problems, 
such as the hermeneutic arts and sciences. 
  
(II) The condition of publicity prescribes that a concern appeals to 
values commonly recognized by all of us; and that it proposes norms 
that, in principle we can all agree on – no matter how different our 
experiences and world views may be. This idea is grounded in the 
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liberal ideal of public reason, and is also expressed in the harm 
principle, according to which thick conceptions of the good life cannot 
justify coercion on behalf of the polity. The condition of publicity 
determines the boundary between public matters and private 
concerns. On a pragmatic account, the liberal conception of public 
reason can do three things for us. (1) It is a practical way of avoiding 
endless and useless debate on things citizens may never agree on; (2) it 
relies on a negative conception of liberty, and negative goals are easier 
to define and less controversial; (3) the public/private distinction – 
shorthand for a great amount of ethical considerations – serves in 
everyday life as a convenient moral guideline. The problem with this 
condition is not liberalism as such, but the narrow way in which it is 
often applied in public debate. Most liberals distinguish between a 
sphere of legitimate power and a sphere of discussion. In the latter, the 
condition of publicity does not necessarily apply. The idea that in 
public debate, concerns should only appeal to uncontroversial values 
and meanings is based on the tacit assumption that all public 
propositions are candidates for state legislation (I call this anticipatory 
liberalism). This idea frustrates the quality of public discourse, in its 
richness and depth. Furthermore, what counts as harm is not as clear-
cut as it seems and sometimes requires public deliberation on 
substantial values. This is also true for the public/private distinction: 
citizens should have the opportunity to convince others that concerns 
now considered private, should actually be regarded as public matters. 
The incomplete but popular interpretation of the ideal of public reason, 
forestalls every public discussion on good food, good taste and the 
good life. 
 
(III) The condition of causality prescribes that a concern articulates a 
problem as the clear consequence of either human action or 
technology. The idea behind this is that causal explanation should be 
prior to the attribution of moral responsibility (for tackling the 
problem). Satisfactory causal explanations – necessary for successful 
agenda setting – are restricted to relevant causes. Causes can be 
relevant in three senses: (1) causes are extraordinary events against 
the background of normal and trivial situations; (2) causes highlight 
the factor of human agency in the sense that these causes can be 
controlled or eliminated; and (3) causes are clear and distinct from 
other factors; they do not point at fuzzy interactions between humans 
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and non-humans. If a causal explanation meets these three 
requirements, it becomes easier to ascribe or accept moral 
responsibility. However, causal explanation does not always precede 
attribution of responsibility. The act of reporting and selecting facts in 
presenting a causal story may already suggest – intended or not – some 
attribution of moral responsibility in the first place. Also, the condition 
of causality wrongfully presupposes that technologies are mere 
instruments, not agents; and that human actions can be clearly 
distinguished from material conditions and circumstances. 
Technologies are more than just instruments as they are able to 
suggest, modify, or compromise our goals and plans. Problems can be 
brought about by an association of humans and technological artefacts. 
Such are many-hands problems. It may be impossible to express this 
problem in terms of who is to blame, but if one, in contrast, is 
interested in the articulation of forward-looking responsibilities, this 
does not necessarily pose a problem. In sum, the three conditions of the 
public innovation agenda (quantifiability, publicity, causality) can be 
useful but there is a price to pay: vital aspects of our relation to food, 
and how they are affected through food technology and innovation, 
remain below the public radar. Societal actors then miss the 
opportunity to engage in a meaningful dialogue on ‘good food’ and 
what that entails for food innovation. 
 
Chapter 4 
The validity of these conditions is based on a too narrow view of 
knowledge, politics and technology. Taken together, these conditions 
can be held responsible for the implicit dichotomy of hard and soft 
concerns. This dichotomy obstructs a meaningful and fruitful dialogue 
on good food and good food technology. As such, it is a serious obstacle 
to trust between consumers and technology developers. I suggest that 
we conceive of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ as rudimentary classifications that 
implicitly follow from the degree to which a concern is considered to 
meet these three conditions. Concerns are not hard in and of 
themselves, but implicitly labeled as such as they tend to meet most of 
the three conditions to a large extent. ‘Soft’ and ‘hard’ can best be 
understood as constructions rather than intrinsic and essential 
properties of these concerns. A constructivist perspective does not 
make an issue any less real or serious and it does not imply that all 
concerns are equally relevant. It only specifies what we mean when we 
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consider concerns as ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. 
 
My discussion of the relatively new issue of food sustainability 
illustrates that ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ are labels that rely on a multi-
dimensional, gradual judgment, and can be seen as both the result and 
the starting point of a public search for numbers, common values, and 
causal stories. It highlights what kind of challenges food sustainability 
as a growing concern had (and still has) to face in order to gain its full 
recognition as a serious food issue – along the lines of the three agenda 
conditions.  
 
(I) Back in the 1960ies, environmental concerns failed to meet the 
condition of publicity. Now, their presence on the innovation agenda 
suggests a substantial moral agreement among stakeholders, but the 
issue still hosts a diversity of normative orientations that do not 
necessarily go hand in hand. There is only very thin common ground, 
where sustainability is framed as deeply entangled with global food 
security.  
 
(II) Also, environmental concerns met the condition of quantifiability 
only to a minimal extent. The history of food sustainability as an issue 
indicates that quantification does not necessarily precede but rather 
goes along with the entrance of sustainability as an issue on the food 
innovation agenda. The growing recognition of problems can be a 
driving force behind further measurements. By developing methods, 
metrics and indicators, pioneers have made food sustainability 
quantifiable. Today, many relevant aspects of food production still are 
to be quantified.  
 
(III) Concerns about unsustainable food barely met the condition of 
causality. Virtually any aspect of the food system and its environments 
can be identified in one way or another as a factor that contributes to 
unsustainable food production and consumption. Thus, actors 
concerned with turning our food system more sustainable have 
suggested a broad range of potential solutions. Most of them recognize 
that food sustainability is a many-hands problem. Only in a general 
sense, humans, not technologies (nor nature for that matter) were 
identified as the cause of unsustainability, but there is little agreement 
on specific responsibilities for tackling the issue of food sustainability. 
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The case of food sustainability offers no exception to my claim that the 
three agenda conditions have to be met before concerns can become 
legitimate issues on the public food innovation agenda. But it also 
shows that the work that these three conditions imply is not finished as 
soon as the issue has been granted access to the public innovation 
agenda. The perfect public issue is not one that is already resolved in 
the first place; but one that has enough potential to grow, develop, and 
transform through collective inquiry. 
 
Chapter 5 
If concerns generally considered as ‘soft’ are to be given a fair 
opportunity to gain access to the food innovation agenda, broadly two 
directions can be taken. The first is more pragmatic and suitable for 
short-term improvements of public dialogue. It presupposes that the 
current three agenda conditions are in themselves reasonable but 
proposes dialogue parties to adopt, respectively, a strategy of 
adaptation and a principle of charity. Here, technology (en)actors and 
societal actors will have to meet each other ‘half way’. The second 
direction is more critical of these conditions and proposes that 
facilitators challenge these conditions by setting up dialogues in such a 
way that stakeholders are encouraged to deliberate on concerns about 
rather qualitative, morally contested, and technologically mediated 
impacts of food innovation. I have specified this second approach in 
chapter 6. 
 
(I) A strategy of adaptation is a way for societal actors to raise concerns 
generally regarded as soft, and present them as legitimate candidates 
for the public innovation agenda. I have identified three modes of 
articulation (strategies) for raising soft concerns – some of which are 
more promising than others: (1) translation, (2) combination and (3) 
entanglement. Translation of ‘soft’ concerns into ‘hard’ impacts relies 
on the idea that ethical, cultural or religious concerns can be 
completely reduced to issues of safety, health, risk or sustainability and 
expressed in the language of numbers and natural sciences. But if 
dialogue partners do not already share the worldview implicit to the 
concern, this is not a promising strategy. The ethical significance of the 
concern will get lost in public deliberation. Combination of ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ concerns occurs where ethical, aesthetic or cultural concerns are 
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presented as part of a broader agenda that also includes concerns that 
are publicly well recognized. As it directs our attention to a broader set 
of issues surrounding food and innovation, combination seems a 
promising strategy in getting soft concerns on the food innovation 
agenda. Yet, it allows technology actors to be selective with regard to 
this broader set, as it does not really challenge the traditional division 
of responsibilities. Entanglement of specific ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ impacts is 
a way of showing that soft concerns are intrinsically connected with 
hard impacts. Strong versions of this mode of articulation demonstrate 
(by means of scientific evidence) why certain ‘hard’ concerns cannot be 
adequately taken care of without taking seriously the ‘softer’ ones. This 
is a promising strategy especially where it explicitly invites addressees 
to rethink the current, implicitly shared distribution of responsibilities 
for good food. My recommendation for societal actors, then, is to align 
their ‘softer’ concerns with the conditions of the food innovation 
agenda by making explicit how their concerns are entangled with more 
publicly recognized problems. 
 
(II) Technology actors as addressees, on their part, can be more 
responsive by suspending the application of the three agenda 
conditions, rather than relying on them as an a priori division of 
responsibilities. They need to assume some degree of reasonableness 
in concerns – even when not all of the facts, values and causal relations 
(and consequently, responsibilities) have been agreed upon. The 
principle of charity exactly prescribes such assumption. The principle of 
charity requires that if you try to understand someone's utterances, 
you presuppose that his statements are (to some degree) rational, 
considering the possibility that a coherent and rational interpretation 
of his statements can be given. The principle reminds us that the 
alternative is the end of conversation. It appeals to the assumption that 
other people matter, and that they have something interesting to tell. 
To act upon this principle is often a leap of faith. Like any principle, it 
does not prescribe the limits of its own application. But keeping in 
mind that the end of conversation is the only alternative, the scope of 
charity ends where the benefit of ignoring ‘soft’ concerns outweights 
the potential benefits of understanding them. From a pragmatic point 
of view, one should remain charitable as long as one reasonably 
expects that there is still the opportunity to learn about new 
perspectives and worldviews. 
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Contrary to the soft/hard dichotomy, the principle of charity does not 
offer clear and stable criteria according to which technology actors can 
assess whether they should take any given concern seriously. Rather, it 
urges them to consider why it is in their interest to get to an 
understanding of what these ‘soft’ concerns may be about. Whether or 
not technology actors should accept a responsibility to act upon ‘soft’ 
concerns can still be subject to the conditions of quantifiability, 
publicity and causality. But a charitable response implies that one is 
willing to suspend those requirements in dialogue, and reconsider 
assumed responsibilities as soon as a given ‘soft’ concern turns out to 
be a legitimate issue over time. My recommendation for technology 
actors is that, when addressed with ‘soft’ concerns, they are patient and 
ask for further clarification, under the presupposition that these are 
perhaps not that irrational and subjective as they seem at face value. 
 
Thus far, my recommendations for societal and technology actors 
presuppose that the three agenda conditions are in themselves not 
unreasonable but need to be used and applied in a more constructive 
manner.  (III) Facilitators, however, in and through their role as ‘meta-
level actors’, have the special capacity to transform our ways of 
speaking and thinking about food concerns in a more fundamental way, 
by questioning the validity of the three agenda conditions in and of 
themselves. That is, certain concerns still require interpretation, rather 
than calculation, if they are to be taken seriously. Furthermore, 
provisional, context-specific and practical agreements can be reached 
even where a fundamental ethical or aesthetic consensus is missing. 
Also, when food concerns point at many hands problems, they imply 
that responsibilities for resolving such problems are likely to be shared 
– e.g. among consumers and food technologists – even where causal 
relations are not specified in an exact manner. These are good reasons 
for questioning the validity of the three agenda conditions as such. 
Given these considerations, and those I presented in chapter 3, my 
twelve recommendations for facilitators are the following. 
 
(1) Mobilize a variety of stakeholders who are likely to draw on 
different sources of knowledge, values and experiences; (2) Encourage 
dialogue parties to take into consideration patterns of interaction 
between the natural, the technological, and the social dimensions of 
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food; (3) Delay definition issues: encourage participants to ask each 
other for tentative explanation and clarification of these concerns 
without forcing them to formulate clear-cut, decisive definitions; (4) 
Stimulate collective reflection and discussion of epistemic rights and 
responsibilities for making factual and normative claims. (5) Present a 
frame, image or narrative that allows most participants to identify, if 
only provisionally, a situation that is commonly recognized as 
problematic; (6) Present the establishment of legally binding rules 
enforced by the state neither as the only resolution to (soft) concerns 
about technological innovation, nor as the sole purpose of the dialogue; 
(7) Do not allow participants to conclude too easily that the identified 
problem is a private matter. (8) Encourage participants to imagine the 
unintended and unforeseen, yet plausible impacts of the innovation; 
(9) Stimulate the investigation, perhaps negotiation, of what good food 
is about; (10) Allow participants to imagine and explicate the 
‘invitations’ and ‘inhibitions’ that food technologies may offer to users, 
consumers and others who may be affected; (11) Encourage 
participants to reconsider the current distribution of normative 
responsibilities. Avoid questions of blame and liability and focus on 
forward-looking responsibilities; (12) Remind participants that 
responsibility can be a matter of degree; and potentially shared, in the 
case of many hands problems. 
 
Chapter 6 
As a specification of my recommendations for facilitators, I introduce a 
specific tool - the techno-ethical scenario - that can be used by 
facilitators to promote the inclusion of a wider range of ethical, cultural 
and political concerns. It is a tool for constructive technology 
assessment (cTA) in a modest sense: rather than having the direct aim 
of broadening the design of new technologies, it aims to broaden the 
public innovation agenda. Techno-ethical scenarios have the aim of 
supporting anticipation, societal learning and reflexivity. But the 
techno-ethical scenario, and its use in stakeholder dialogues, is 
distinctive in three ways. (1) It seeks to broaden the innovation agenda 
to a larger extent than most ELSA programs do, by opening up dialogue 
for any concern that – at face value – seems to be subjective, private, 
irrational or irrelevant. (2) Therefore, it is specifically suitable for the 
assessment of those technological innovations that are easily framed 
by most stakeholders as commodities of the market place. It has a 
203 
 
special eye for the risk of privatization. (3) It has a strong focus on 
instructive purposes. Making use of DAM, it aims to make dialogue 
parties aware of how they implicitly claim or reject epistemic rights 
and responsibilities for issues; and the effects of such talk on the 
development of conversation. 
 
In 2012-2013, I have put this tool to the test in close collaboration with 
a research team of philosophers and science communication 
researchers. As facilitators, we organized three stakeholder dialogues 
on food technology and innovation. The sessions serve as a proof of 
concept to see if both my analysis and recommendations are close 
enough to improve the scope and quality of dialogue – and thus result 
in a more responsive interaction between societal and technology 
actors.  
 
For the dialogues, we drafted techno-ethical scenarios according to the 
following design criteria. 
 
(1) Field specific: the staged controversy in the scenario is about the 
experience and evaluation of food and not technology-centred. (2) 
Concern-based: the storyline does not exclusively describe hard 
impacts of technology but rather pictures those societal concerns 
which are generally considered as soft. (3) Open to interpretation: the 
storyline describes more of ‘talk’ than ‘action’, through which 
characters express their concerns. These are not presented as a given 
fact, nor as a problem per se, but as a reported concern, the meaning of 
which is contested and left open for readers to discuss. (4) Narrative: 
the use of a story makes the depicted situation more concrete and thus 
easier to imagine. It offers a sequence of events, decisions and 
responses, so that the participants are invited to evaluate the course of 
action taken by the characters. (5) Multi-layered: problems are to be 
found in concerns about what technology does, and how the characters 
respond to and discuss those concerns: a problem of technology and a 
problem of communication. Even where participants do not initially 
recognize soft concerns as legitimate issues in themselves, at least they 
are given a reason to take these concerns seriously as a potential 
obstruction to successful, socially robust food innovations. 
 
In each of the dialogues, a variety of stakeholders participated from the 
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food processing industry, private and public research institutes, 
governmental and semi-governmental policy advice, and consumer-
related NGO’s. We attempted to bring together participants who may 
have a strong sense of what good food is about, and have differing 
perspectives on that question. If no agreement exists on who is to be 
held accountable for giving meaning and interpretation to the concern 
at hand, it becomes a dialogue of the deaf. A dialogue more hospitable 
to soft concerns, then, requires a discussion of epistemic rights and 
responsibilities. Therefore, by means of the Discursive Action Method, 
we made participants aware of recurring, often implicit interactional 
patterns that hinder open communication between stakeholders. 
 
In order to encourage participants to deliberate on present and future 
responsibilities for impacts of food technology and innovation in a 
constructive manner, the introductory part of the sessions also 
featured a short discussion of how to approach the notion of 
responsibility. In order to avoid discussions of blame and liability, we 
asked the participants to focus on forward-looking responsibilities. 
Also, we presented them with an illustrative case from which it became 
clear that responsibility is not necessarily attributed to single 
individuals but sometimes can be shared. Furthermore, we suggested 
to participants that there is a space in between state legislation on the 
one hand, and privatization on the other, for potential resolutions for 
moral conflict. We did this by both scenario design and moderation of 
the discussion. 
 
In the sessions we observed that participants gained a shared insight 
into the interactional effects of implicit claims to epistemic authority 
for the progress of a conversation, but we are not sure if this 
understanding also fed into the subsequent discussion of the scenario. 
At least we noticed that participants affiliated with industrial 
engineering and food science displayed a more responsive and open 
attitude with regard to the notion of naturalness than we observed in 
our earlier analysis of food controversies. Occasionally, participants 
seemed reluctant to further elaborate on the concept of naturalness – 
typically regarded as a ‘soft’ concern. As the dialogues proceeded, 
however, participants eventually arrived at an implicit agreement that 
the developments as envisioned in the scenario were problematic. 
Especially in the third session, participants were willing and able to 
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articulate specific ideas about natural food: what it means and why it is 
important to them. More than in the other sessions, these participants 
were more eager to explore and negotiate the meaning of naturalness. 
 
Scepticism about the possibility of ever reaching consensus on a clear 
definition of naturalness posed a serious obstacle to the discussion of 
consequent responsibilities, but eventually, in all of the sessions, 
several different notions of ‘natural’ were brought to the table. Rather 
than taking a strong and confident stance, the participants tentatively 
explored the concept of naturalness by probing the concept and 
negotiating its limits of application. While specific responsibilities were 
not discussed at all, most participants seemed to agree that the concern 
about naturalness is worth of serious consideration, and that this 
concern requires a collective organization of responsibilities. Some of 
the participants were able to draw explicit links between the epistemic 
and normative status of naturalness on the one hand, and taking 
forward-looking responsibilities for natural food on the other. 
 
The report of these dialogues does not provide a full-blown 
experimental proof of the validity of this approach, nor does it pretend 
to do so. Rather it provides a ‘proof of concept’. As a practical 
suggestion for facilitators, it should provide an idea of how it can be 
done. The scenarios used by us are prototypes to be further developed, 
and should indicate where to start and what direction to take. The 
difficulties we faced in organizing a stakeholder more hospitable to 
‘soft’ concerns provide with additional evidence for my analysis of the 
public discourse of food technology and innovation: stakeholders share 
deeply held convictions about the relevance, cogency and public 
significance of certain types of food concerns and their consequent 
hierarchy. Apparently these persistent convictions are hard to tackle, 
arguably because they are embedded in broader conceptions of science 
and knowledge, ethics and politics, technology and responsibility. But 
taking into account the actual advances that we have made with our 
approach in challenging the soft/hard dichotomy, these are good 
reasons for further developing and testing this approach, and making it 
work in sustainable, on-going stakeholder dialogues and public debates 
on the question of good food. 
